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Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in Iran

A. Fattah, Vienna

Unlike other verification cases, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) confidence about the nature of Iran's program has been shaken because of two decades of undeclared activities. To resolve the issue and for providing the assurances that all nuclear materials in Iran has been declared to the agency and is under safeguards, the IAEA has been verifying Iran's nuclear program for the past four years. This has been the subject in all past IAEA Board of Governor meetings. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) also in a resolution, 1737 adopted in 2006 requested Iran without further delay to resolve outstanding issues in order to built confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear program particularly to suspend its enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water related projects. It also decided that Iran shall provide access and cooperation with the IAEA requests in order to verify suspension activities, resolve all outstanding issues and promptly ratify the Additional Protocol that ensures smooth implementation of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT).

Iran considers these as an interference by the UNSC and emphasis it a barrier to enter into constructive, "but not a superficial, negotiation" with the IAEA "aimed at resolving the outstanding issues". The issues of suspension of certain activities is in contradiction to its inalienable rights stipulated in the NPT article IV: "Nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination". In addition, "all parties to the treaty undertake to facilitate, and have right to participate in fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the uses of nuclear energy". Iran insists that certain Nuclear Weapons States, not only have failed to fulfill their obligations and undertakings for the cessation of the nuclear arm race and nuclear disarmament, pursuant to Article VI but also have denied other NPT parties to benefit from their legal and inalienable rights for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Iran stated voluntary measures (which is not part of safeguards agreement) and legal obligations are not to be confused. Although it is against its inalienable right it did suspends its uranium enrichment activities voluntarily for two and half years as a gesture for confidence building, which is unprecedented in IAEA history. The IAEA in the last three years conducted over 2000 man-day inspections on Iran nuclear activities.

Since November 2006 Iran resumed limited operation of its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and enriched about some sixty kg to less than 5% enrichment (which is what is needed for nuclear fuel manufacturing and well below needed for nuclear explosive). The IAEA conducted 13 inspections with 29 man-days and confirmed it consistent with declaration. In January 2007 Iran informed the IAEA that it would like to operate the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) by end February 2007 on limited scale. The IAEA since November 2006 has conducted 15 inspection amounting to 38 man-days conducting design verification, installed 7 new surveillance cameras and applying seals at 22 sensitive points. The IAEA intends to relocate cameras into the cascade hall soon. It has also collected samples to establish baseline. However the IAEA states that it has no information regarding the assembly of centrifuge although it has conducted design verification. Regarding reprocessing activities IAEA found no indication of any ongoing activities. Regarding heavy water related activities IAEA carried two inspections with 4 man-days. Satellite imagery indicates that heavy water production plant is continuing.

Iran signed the Additional Protocol in December 2003 by is yet to ratify. Although not a legal obligation Iran has submitted voluntarily over 1300 pages of initial declaration in accordance with the Additional Protocol. The declaration has been updated and verified by the IAEA. Iran has granted full and unlimited access to all nuclear material and facilities including the uranium enrichment and conversion facilities. It has granted more than 26 complementary accesses to 55 locations. It has also granted access to military sites, over 20 cases, where results of IAEA verification proved the allegations against Iran to be baseless.

The IAEA concludes that: Pursuant to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran has been providing the agency with access to declared nuclear material and facilities, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with such material The agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. However the agency is unable to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities unless Iran ratifies Additional Protocol.

Iran thinks its oil and gas resave will dry up eventually, justifying the need to produce nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants to meet future energy needs, so that it does not have to "beg the West". Its oil reserve is estimated to be 137 billion barrels and gas reserves are beloved to stand at 28 trillion cubic meters. Iran argues that it needs to develop other sources of energy for when oil reserves run out. They see no reason why some of mankind's most advanced technology should be off limits to their scientists. The United States accuses Iran of using its civilian nuclear activities as a cover to secretly produce nuclear weapons. Iran has rejected the charge. Iran plans to produce 20,000 megawatts of electricity through nuclear power plants in the next two decades. Iran reiterated that it would seriously pursue its nuclear activities.

IAEA in several occasions has stated that existing measurement and evaluation methodology do not permit a clear determination of all observation. It appears that the IAEA does not possess required verification technologies. The IAEA unable with its present capabilities to detect all activities, declared or not.

The IAEA Board of Governor meeting is currently discussing what measures to take in order to implement UNSC resolution. But its members are having divergent views on what measures to take.